gun law

  • Analysis of the Debate Over “Ghost Gun” Bans

    Analysis of the Debate Over “Ghost Gun” Bans

    The legal fight over state “ghost gun” bans is moving again, and a fresh decision out of the Tenth Circuit is already changing the playbook for how these laws get defended after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

    This week, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued a split decision in NAGR v. Polis, a case challenging Colorado’s restrictions on firearms, frames, and receivers that lack serial numbers. The plaintiffs, led by the National Association for Gun Rights, were appealing a district court ruling from May 2024 that refused to temporarily block Colorado’s law while the lawsuit proceeds.

    Colorado still gets to keep its statute in force for now. But the panel did something that matters well beyond this one dispute: it rejected a common argument lower courts have been using to avoid Bruen’s history-and-tradition test—especially when a law touches the act of possessing a firearm.

    The district court had treated Colorado’s possession prohibition as if it were basically a sales rule, reasoning that it operated like a “condition or qualification on the commercial sale of firearms.” Under that framing, the judge concluded the possession restriction didn’t even fall within the Second Amendment’s text, sidestepping Bruen’s requirement to justify gun regulations through historical analogues.

    The Tenth Circuit refused to go along. Writing for the majority, Judge Joel Carson said the possession ban regulates possession of an unserialized firearm or frame regardless of how it was acquired. The panel’s point was straightforward: calling a possession ban a “commercial regulation” doesn’t make it one, and the Second Amendment’s protection of keeping arms can’t be analyzed away by re-labeling the restriction as something about prior transactions.

    That holding directly undercuts the “commercial regulation” workaround that has become increasingly popular in post-Bruen litigation. Courts have leaned on it most often to sustain rules like waiting periods and some background-check-related requirements by describing them as regulating acquisition rather than the “keeping” and “bearing” of arms. Whatever the ultimate fate of those other laws, the Tenth Circuit’s message here is clear: once a statute criminalizes or prohibits possession itself, the analysis can’t be dodged by pretending it’s only about commerce.

    The panel also revived key parts of the challenge to Colorado’s purchasing restrictions for unserialized parts and kits. The district court had dismissed that portion as premature, saying the plaintiffs weren’t facing a distinct harm because federal rules—specifically the ATF’s “unfinished frames and receivers” final rule—covered the same conduct anyway. In other words, the lower court treated federal regulation as making Colorado’s ban irrelevant for purposes of the lawsuit.

    The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Judge Carson explained that the ATF’s rule does block some transactions involving unserialized parts kits, but it doesn’t sweep as broadly as Colorado’s statute. One major difference the panel highlighted is that the ATF rule does not apply to private individuals in the way Colorado’s law does. So if the plaintiffs want to buy from private sellers, Colorado’s statute creates an additional, separate legal injury that a court ruling could actually remedy.

    Because of that, the appeals court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to take another look at the request to block enforcement—this time with the correct understanding of both the possession ban and the acquisition ban.

    That remand was the extent of the immediate wins for the challengers. On the manufacturing side of Colorado’s law, the panel adopted a narrow interpretation of what counts as “manufacturing” under the statute—an interpretation that effectively removed the plaintiffs’ intended conduct from the scope of the provision they were attacking.

    The plaintiffs said they planned to build privately made firearms from parts kits by turning unfinished frames or receivers into finished ones. The court framed the core question as whether finishing an unfinished frame or receiver is “manufacturing” under Colorado law. The state compared the process to assembling a model airplane from a kit, arguing that ordinary usage wouldn’t label assembly as manufacturing.

    The panel found support for the state’s interpretation in how the statute described related concepts. Judge Carson pointed to the law’s definition of a 3D printer as a “manufacturing device” that produces an object through an additive process. By contrast, the statute described the process at issue—taking an unfinished frame to a finished one—as “completing,” “assembling,” or “converting,” rather than “producing” it through a manufacturing process.

    Based on that textual context, the Tenth Circuit concluded the manufacturing ban targets making frames or receivers from raw materials, not finishing or assembling an already-manufactured unfinished frame into a completed one. With that reading in place, the panel dismissed the plaintiffs’ manufacturing-ban challenge because, as interpreted, the law didn’t prohibit what they said they wanted to do.

    So where does that leave the broader debate over ghost gun bans?

    Right now, Colorado’s entire framework remains on the books while the district court re-evaluates the surviving claims. It’s also impossible to predict how the lower court will apply the full Second Amendment framework once it returns to the merits.

    But the direction from the Tenth Circuit reshapes how these disputes are likely to be argued, especially under Bruen. The panel’s opinion signals that a possession restriction—particularly one that applies no matter how an item was obtained—must be treated as a direct burden on the right to keep arms, not smuggled into a “commercial sales regulation” category to avoid constitutional scrutiny. And by rejecting the idea that the ATF’s separate regulatory regime makes state acquisition bans unchallengeable, the ruling keeps state laws from being insulated simply because federal rules touch some of the same territory.

    In practical terms, the court didn’t strike down Colorado’s ghost gun law. What it did do is remove a convenient escape hatch. For states defending ghost gun bans that reach possession, the Tenth Circuit has made the path narrower: if the law regulates possession, courts in this circuit will have to confront the Second Amendment question head-on, with Bruen’s historical-analogue analysis in view rather than parked off to the side.

  • Trump Administration Reschedules Marijuana, Says It Won’t Affect Supreme Court Gun and Cannabis Case

    Trump Administration Reschedules Marijuana, Says It Won’t Affect Supreme Court Gun and Cannabis Case

    The Justice Department is taking a meaningful step toward easing federal marijuana controls, but it’s also making clear that the change does not automatically translate into near-term relief for marijuana users who possess firearms—especially in the Supreme Court fight now pending in US v. Hemani.

    On Thursday, DOJ issued a final order that moves marijuana to a less restrictive status under the federal scheduling system and expands the set of circumstances in which marijuana-related products can be used lawfully. At the same time, Solicitor General John Sauer notified the Supreme Court that, in the administration’s view, the new scheduling decision should not alter how the justices resolve Hemani’s challenge to the federal ban on gun possession by certain drug users.

    Sauer’s message to the Court is straightforward: the government does not believe the rescheduling order changes the legal questions in Hemani in a way that requires a different outcome. The case involves a man charged after agents recovered a firearm from his home and he acknowledged using marijuana multiple times per week. DOJ is continuing to defend its ability to enforce the gun prohibition in at least some marijuana-related scenarios.

    What the new DOJ order does—and what it does not do—matters for anyone trying to understand how enforcement may look in the months ahead.

    The order relaxes restrictions, but it does not create blanket federal legalization. Instead, DOJ describes the change as applying broadly to marijuana and marijuana derivatives regulated under the Controlled Substances Act, including marijuana extracts and delta‑9‑tetrahydrocannabinol, as well as other marijuana-plant-derived compounds (excluding mature stalks and seeds) that are not considered hemp. Critically, DOJ ties the practical scope of the order to specific channels: the marijuana-related substances must be part of an FDA-approved drug product or must fall under a state-issued license that authorizes manufacturing, distribution, or dispensing for medical purposes (a “state medical marijuana license”). The order also places those drugs onto the list of substances that can be imported or exported only with a permit.

    From an enforcement perspective, this structure suggests a potential narrowing of the highest-risk category of federal scrutiny for certain medical use pathways. It also hints at how the administration may want to draw lines between medical and recreational use when deciding where to direct resources. But the rescheduling action still leaves major constraints in place for gun owners.

    The main reason is that the federal firearms prohibition at issue—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)—does not hinge on whether marijuana is placed in Schedule I or Schedule III. The statute bars gun and ammunition possession by anyone who is an “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” It does not distinguish between drugs across schedules, and it does not include an exception simply because a state has legalized marijuana. The relevant federal question is whether the substance remains federally controlled and whether the individual’s use is unlawful under federal law.

    That’s why the administration can simultaneously ease certain federal marijuana rules and still argue that § 922(g)(3) remains enforceable against some marijuana users who have firearms.

    The reaction from gun-rights advocates has been optimistic. Some activists are treating the scheduling move as a practical shield for gun owners who use medical marijuana consistent with state law, predicting fewer prosecutions and less fear of being categorized as a prohibited person.

    The firearm industry, however, is signaling caution. When President Donald Trump floated the rescheduling plan late last year, the National Shooting Sports Foundation advised members not to change how they handle firearm sales based on the proposal—at least not until the legal and regulatory picture became clearer. The group’s compliance messaging stressed that marijuana users can still be treated as prohibited persons under § 922(g)(3), that state legalization does not change the federal analysis, and that possession of a state medical marijuana card should be viewed as evidence of unlawful use for purposes of the gun-ban statute.

    DOJ’s Supreme Court filing in Hemani reinforces that the government is not backing away from the prosecution posture in that case. Sauer’s letter emphasizes two reasons the final order should not disrupt Hemani.

    First, the government points to timing: in its view, Hemani’s criminal exposure depends on the law in effect when the alleged offense occurred, not on later regulatory changes. At the time of the charged conduct, marijuana remained a Schedule I substance.

    Second, Sauer argues that even under the new final order, Hemani’s marijuana use would not be covered by the rescheduling’s practical carve-outs because the marijuana involved was not part of an FDA-approved product and was not within a state medical marijuana licensing framework. Under that understanding, the government maintains that Hemani’s conduct would still fall on the Schedule I side of the line anyway.

    The Supreme Court’s questioning at oral argument last month suggests that several justices are not entirely comfortable with the government’s theory—particularly the suggestion that ordinary marijuana use reliably maps onto dangerousness in a way that justifies disarmament. Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s questioning captured the issue directly by pressing for evidence that using marijuana a couple of times per week makes someone dangerous, and by probing whether the government’s logic would extend to unlawful use of other prescription drugs such as Ambien or Xanax.

    In his follow-up to the Court, Sauer also floated a potential off-ramp for the justices: if they want to avoid addressing how § 922(g)(3) applies to medical marijuana in a post-rescheduling world, they could craft a narrower decision focused only on Schedule I marijuana and leave the constitutionality of the statute as applied to Schedule III marijuana for another case.

    For now, the operational takeaway is that DOJ’s rescheduling order may open additional lawful avenues for marijuana-related products in specific regulated settings, and it may change the political and practical context for some future enforcement decisions. But it does not, by itself, rewrite § 922(g)(3), nor does it persuade the administration to abandon its defense of that statute in US v. Hemani. Gun owners who use marijuana—especially outside FDA-approved channels or state medical licensing—should assume federal risk remains until courts or Congress change the underlying firearms law.

    The Supreme Court is expected to issue its Hemani decision by the end of June.